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I offer both my thanks and my congratulations to the
members of the University of North Carolina's First Amendment
Law Review. No doubt the sands are shifting, in North Carolina
and across the country, in the operation of judicial elections. The
intrusion of invigorated notions of free expression, the impact of
various attempts at electoral reform, and the necessity for
corresponding changes in standards of judicial ethics have
dramatically dislodged traditional patterns in judges' campaigns.
The future, therefore, is profoundly unclear. It will scarcely
resemble the past. So this marvelous symposium could hardly be
more timely. Nor could its participants be more knowledgeable
and interesting. This volume will add markedly to our unfolding, if
contested, understanding of the benefits and pitfalls of judicial
selection.
The altered landscape begins, of course, with the United
States Supreme Court's notable decision in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White.' There the Court, by a 5-4 margin, ruled for the
first time on the constitutionality of a judicial ethics provision.
Applying a robust vision of the First Amendment to judicial
elections, the Justices invalidated the "announce clause" of the
Minnesota code. Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia
concluded "we have never allowed the government to prohibit
candidates from communicating relevant information to voters
during an election." 2  Raising perhaps more questions that it
resolved, the opinion determined that "if [a] State chooses to tap
the energy and the legitimizing power of the democratic process, it
* Dean and Burton Craige Professor, University of North Carolina
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1. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
2. 536 U.S. at 782.
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must accord the participants in that process the First Amendment
rights that attach to their roles.",
3
It is not unlikely that the White case will lead to new and
broader tensions with the traditional belief that judicial impartiality
and independence can be assured by imposing standards of
etiquette on judicial candidates. The majority was slim. But the
assertions proffered were seemingly far reaching. First, much of
White's foundation stemmed from an asserted right of democratic
voters to receive core political messages-rather than a candidate's
arguably waivable right to speak them. Such central democratic
touchstones are not easily marginalized or thrust aside.
Second, Justice Scalia and his colleagues could easily have
decided the White case on narrower vagueness or overbreadth
grounds. They chose, instead, to reach for the heart of a First
Amendment collision that could have been avoided. Justices who
go so clearly out of their way to make a point won't easily change
their minds.
Third, even though White was a bare majority decision, and
even though I would concede that my own favorite justices appear
in the dissenting column, it seems to me unlikely that the Court will
reverse the core conclusion that a full-throated version of the First
Amendment applies to judicial elections. It might have been
possible to stay away from the issue in the first place, leaving the
outcome murky. But it is not plausible now to simply step back and
say the First Amendment is not a relevant proscription after all.
So, in my view, White is not only here, it is likely here to
stay. And if the First Amendment raises issues about
"announcement," "pledging," and comment, it also likely raises
questions about campaign finance, political affiliation,
endorsement, and a host of other historical constraints. I don't
purport to know what the answers to such vital questions may be.
But I'd be very surprised if, in the months and years ahead, they
aren't soundly presented. Our high Court's ultimate answer to the
challenges of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White may be
Justice O'Connor's suggestion in concurrence - if states don't like
the harsh results of no-holds-barred electoral campaigns, they
3. 536 U.S. at 788.
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should stop electing judges altogether.
But in many states like [I fear] North Carolina, a regime of
appointed judges is nowhere near the horizon. Given that, the
North Carolina Supreme Court has moved fairly aggressively to
alter our code of judicial ethics.' Sitting judges and candidates for
office will now be allowed to commit to controversial substantive
positions. They will be permitted to raise campaign funds through
direct solicitation and participate more broadly in other political
races a well. Though implementing a reasonable reading of White's
standards, the court's proffered rule changes sparked immense
controversy. As a result, Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake appointed a
distinguished advisory committee to explore appropriate standards
for political conduct by judges. Answers, once again, have not been
easy to come by.
Citizen political reformers also engaged from another
direction in North Carolina. Expressing growing concern over the
effects of both political partisanship and campaign fundraising on
the independence and integrity of judicial decision-making, activists
convinced receptive legislators to adopt a new system for the
election of appellate judges. Judicial candidates are no longer to be
identified by political party on the ballot. And a limited scheme of
public funding is available to candidates agreeing to abide by its
conditions. Again, our practices will be notably different than
before.
Given such complexities, and given such a cast of seemingly
inevitable alterations, we are fortunate that the First Amendment
Law Review has brought together experts, activists, and leaders like
James Bopp, Chris Hagearty, Bob Hall, and former justices Penny
White and Robert Orr to explore the changing relationships
between judicial and political power. I have learned much from
their discussions. I think you will as well.
4. 536 U.S. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
5. North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 7 (2004).
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